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KOREA REMEMBERED Chapter 37 |
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KOREA REMEMBERED Compiled by "MAURIE" PEARS The extracts below have been taken from various publications, to highlight the extraordinary fighting skill and courage of the Australian soldiers in Korea, principal of which are Bob O'Neill's Official History "Australia in the Korean War", David Horner's "Duty First", Bob Breen's "Kapyong" and "Battle of Maryang San" and the Journals of the Royal United Service Institution of New South Wales all of which are all gratefully acknowledged. > (The following extracts taken from "KAPYONG" by "Bob Breen" and published by Headquarters Training Command are gratefully acknowledged.) John Grey The Australian Army's participation in the Korean War included several quite exceptional unit actions. In 1950-51, 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR), maintained the excellent reputation of the Australian profession of arms by fighting well during both offensive and defensive operations. This tradition was continued by the other battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment after they were deployed to Korea in 1952. Of all the military feats of the battalions of the RAR in Korea, only the Battle of Kapyong was recognised formally with the award of a US Presidential Unit Citation. The citation was shared with a Canadian infantry battalion and a US tank company. It elevated a hard-fought rearguard action to the most commemorated Australian battalion action of the Korean War. The Battle of Kapyong was a rearguard defensive action followed by a fighting withdrawal. Kapyong was not a big battle but it was an important one. Timing was the key to its importance and subsequent recognition. By nightfall on 23 April 1951, an entire Republic of Korea infantry division had been forced into chaotic retreat by attacking Chinese formations. Thousands of South Korean soldiers and panic-stricken civilians streamed past the hastily prepared blocking positions of 3 RAR, as well as 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and A Company, US 72nd Heavy Tank Battalion. These units were ordered to deny advancing Chinese formations a route down the Kapyong Valley into the South Korean Capital of Seoul for as long as possible. Under the cover of darkness scores of Chinese soldiers, hidden among the felling South Koreans, infiltrated past the Australian positions. Following Chinese units repeatedly attacked the Australians straight off their line of march. Despite being outflanked, and initially without adequate artillery and mortar support, the Australians held for 24 hours before withdrawing intact. Then the Canadians held for a further 24 hours and did the same. The 48 hours respite enabled United Nations formations further south to regroup and establish a defensive line which subsequently stopped the Chinese offensive. This high level of morale can only be maintained in defence and during a fighting withdrawal when commanders remain steady under sustained pressure. Soldiers must trust and have confidence in their commanders, in themselves and in each other. The commanders of 3 RAR and their men displayed these attributes during the Battle of Kapyong. Their recollections contained in this monograph testify to their fighting spirit, their self confidence and their commitment to each other. Robert O'Neill, the Official War Historian If any factor stands out in 3 RAR's conduct at Kapyong it is the unfailingly high morale which its members showed throughout the battle. It was difficult enough to fight off waves of attacks at night. It was yet more demanding to endure the following day in a relatively open position, exposed to the enemy on all sides, cut off from other battalions by several kilometres and under constant fire. The greatest test of morale was the final withdrawal, which was carried out by exhausted men in considerable danger without giving in to depression, fear or panic of any kind. "Don" Beard ...a group of young officers from the Engineers, Infantry and Medical Corps, together with some sisters from the BCOF hospital and some American Red Cross girls were about to set off in a hired Japanese steam launch. There were great plans for a weekend of sailing on the Inland Sea with the Saturday night on an island where a dinner had been arranged. None of this was to happen. Inevitably the announcement came that all United Nations personnel were to report back to their base units. We were not happy about going. We scarcely knew where Korea was nor whether or not we were involved in the United Nations. But return we did. The units formed for service in Korea were a mixture of Regular Army career soldiers and short term temporary enlistments. These included young men like myself who felt they should give some contribution to the Army because of their inability to serve during World War II. There were many others who had joined the Army to escape from something in Australia. 'Something' may have been a woman, creditors, or the law. A motley crew was gathered. 'Ben' O'Dowd When the Korean War broke out 3 RAR was in the process of packing up to return to the mainland. The unit had been reduced to just three very under strength rifle companies. The Korean War began within five years of World War II so that, back in Australia, there existed a reservoir of adventurous, trained and blooded ex-AIF men keen to get into another scrap. These fellows provided badly needed skills and experience. My company at Kapyong [A Company] was 87% ex-AIF K Force. Editors' Note For the Australians, the coming of the Chinese offensive coincided with the death of their new CO. On 30 October a stray Chinese shell cleared the crest of a hill and exploded near where Charlie Green was sleeping. A piece of shrapnel sliced into his stomach and two days later he died from complications resulting from this wound: no one else in the area was hit by fragments from the shell that killed him. Bruce Ferguson It is one thing to take over a command in peacetime and enjoy the luxury of a new appointment but quite another to assume command of a unit in combat. That day left me with agonizing doubts as to my ability. It was clear to me that the Battalion had not recovered from their recent setback, and I was still under assessment by every digger. That night I got to thinking how Charlie Green would have tackled the problem and it was then that I realized he had left behind a legacy I should try to carry on. It was not long before it became apparent to me that I had inherited the loneliest command any man could have. Being the senior Australian, I was solely responsible for anything that might befall the Australian battalion in Korea ... With no one to turn to for advice in whatever situation I might find myself, it was, as I have said, the loneliest command ever allotted to an Australian battalion commander on foreign soil. "Don" Beard The winter months taught me about the multitude of problems with which I would have to deal. Most medical problems were caused by the effects of the dreadful climate. There were occasional encounters with the enemy and I would be called upon to treat gunshot wounds. There were also psychological problems within a group of men who felt that they had been forgotten by Australia. The diggers wondered why they were there and how long it would be before the War would end. They wondered how long it would be before they might be replaced by the dwindling number of replacements. I rapidly found that my role as the RMO was more important as a counselor than as a dresser of wounds. Operations during the Korean winter required tremendous physical and mental fitness which tested many of the members to the limit ... It was a series of forced marches, brief battles, consolidation and then further advances. We lived in shallow defensive trenches which were rapidly dug in the snow as protection against the enemy and the elements. We went on day after day without relief. I very quickly became proud to be an Australian because of their efforts. The soldiers when they saw a pile of straw kicked it and out would bolt a North Korean. Up with a rifle, down with a North Korean and the Australians thoroughly enjoyed it. A Company was already standing by behind the Middlesex so it was obvious we would get the task. Ferg's briefing gave me great encouragement to succeed. He said, 'The Brits have been unsuccessful twice and now all eyes are on the Australians. Don't you come back without it.' I knew he was not kidding! 'Sardine' was on a ridge-line running parallel to the one from which we were observing the efforts of the Middlesex. A deep, well-timbered gully lay between. A frontal attack would involve my men descending into this gully before rushing up a steep slope onto the enemy positions. This was what the Middlesex had done, twice. This was a tactic profoundly disliked by the Diggers who described it disparagingly as 'going straight up the guts.' "Lou" Brumfield I rejoined the Battalion two days before the Battle of Kapyong ... ANZAC Day was coming up. We had a big thing going with the Turks. We had even sent a recce [reconnaissance] party over to have a look. The beer ration had been increased. Bruce Ferguson As to my situation [on the morning of 23 April 1951], I am reminded of a conversation I overheard between two Pitcairn Islanders of our company in the Owen Stanley Ranges of New Guinea [during the South West Pacific Campaign in 1943]. One was a Private and the other a Lance Corporal who were arguing between them about the lack of information [getting through about the tactical situation]. The Lance Corporal summed up his feelings [to the Private who wanted more information] 'The trouble with you is that you think I know f__k nothing, in fact, I know f__k all. That summed up my position. I finally received orders from the Brigade Commander [Burke] to occupy a blocking position north of Kapyong. With no opportunity for personal reconnaissance, my orders were that the Battalion was to occupy a blocking position so as to prevent any Chinese advance upon the capital. 'Alf' Argent I still recall the morning the CO (Ferguson) and I recced [conducted a reconnaissance of] the area [near Chuktun-ni] and later held the O Group. It was a beautiful, warm day with clear, blue skies. War seemed a long way off. I respected "Fergie" [Ferguson]. He was a very brave man - even if I thought he was an exhibitionist because he never carried a weapon and strolled around all the time with a bloody walking stick. He was a brave infantryman but I was critical of his positioning of the Battalion on the ground at Kapyong. He always positioned his Battalion Headquarters in isolation from the companies and did this again at Kapyong. He liked a neatly sign posted and well-laid out BHQ ... There was no Tactical or Battle Headquarters inside the main Battalion defensive position up with the forward companies. His first mistake was to locate B Company in an isolated forward position. It was obvious that when the enemy came they would attack right where B Company was located - B Company were going to cop the lot ... I do not think it was a good position at all. I think he put B Company there because he underestimated the Chinese reaction. As an infantry commander I would have put B Company back in reserve behind A and D Companies. Then we would have had a tight battalion perimeter with lots of depth, mutual support and a safe route [along the high ridge line running south from Hill 504] for re-supply and withdrawal. It ( the PIAT - projector infantry anti-tank) could only be fired successfully by A Grade Front Row Forwards [a position for a big man in Rugby Union football] in robust health with nerves of steel. Best effective range? Approximately ten feet. 'Doc' Tampling The bullets ripped through the RAP (Regimental Aid Post) tent - halfway up the tent. I told the doctor he had better keep his head down. He wanted to know what the hell what was going on. Dr Don Beard was 6 foot 6 inches tall and stood a pretty good chance of getting his head blown off. I told him again to keep his head down as more bullets cracked through the canvas. We definitely knew that it was on in our area. Author "Bob" Breen The sounds of the tanks withdrawing prompted Lieutenant Jim Young, the acting 2IC B Company, to run out to try to persuade them to stay and support the company. He responded so urgently that he ran down the side of the hill and onto the valley floor without a weapon. One of the tank crew told Young that he was moving to the rear to get medical attention for wounded crew members and to obtain a re-supply of ammunition. Young persuaded him to stay and support B Company for a while longer, on condition that his wounded crew members were evacuated to the rear in B Company jeeps. Young also promised that these vehicles would obtain ammunition from A Echelon and bring it forward to him "Jim" Young As I lay in the ditch, the Chinese Communist Force literally ran over me after the tank down the road. They flung a few grenades in my direction but did no harm beyond singeing my moustache and hair. I lay quiet for sometime, while the noise of the pursuit faded south then I cautiously made my way back to B Company lines. Wilfred Millar, a young West Point graduate I stopped a platoon of our tanks that were coming back. It was at this point that I learned that they had dead and wounded among them. I saw the body of Lt Di Martino, the Platoon Leader, who had been shot between the eyes. I had never expected to see such a sight and I will never forget it. ... I decided to walk forward and find out what was going on. I was alone, walked some distance, realized there were soldiers on my left, right and front in crouched positions but stretched out in long files from front to rear - not more than three yards from me. George Harris The Chinese kept coming up on 1 Platoon and 1 Platoon kept knocking them back. Each time they knocked them back, the Chinese just disappeared for a while. The bugles would start again and 1 Platoon would cop it again. In between assaults the wounded and dead were brought back and fit men were repositioned by section commanders into forward positions. Groups of Chinese also began to attack CHQ and 3 Platoon. With these fellas prowling around, the whole position was in danger of being overrun. "Phil" Bennett An hour before first light, when the fighting in our area died down, I sent a ground party to link up with BHQ. That's when I found out that the Battalion Commander had moved part of his headquarters south earlier that night. I hadn't been aware of it at that stage. ... When there was more light I walked over and spoke to Len Eyles who told me that he was organizing the withdrawal of Battalion Headquarters from that area ... He told me that the [forward] companies were probably going to withdraw during the day ... No mention had been made of Antitank Platoon so I, and a couple of others, walked over to them and told them to pack up and get out. I saw the Platoon Sergeant [Milwood] who was very badly wounded in the stomach. He was still alive but very much on his last legs. "Bob" Parker ... I was about to brake and do a slide down off the road to a hut when, amidst a lot of thumping and banging, the front wheel went from under the bike like a horse with a busted front leg. I had become fairly good at coming off bikes but something went wrong this time and I landed on the side of my head and right shoulder and then into the ditch beside the road. My Owen [Owen Machine Carbine] had been slung over my shoulder with bayonet attached. I think this is what upset my ejection routine. Anyhow the darn thing fired but didn't eject the shell. Lucky I did not blow my head off. The bike was roaring its head off above me on the road so I reckoned I'd better turn it off. I climbed up behind it and was reaching for the ignition switch when there was a thump and a great hole appeared in the seat next to my head. It was a .50 calibre machine gun on fixed lines having a go every time I moved. I slid back down and endeavoured to extract the empty shell from the gun with my bayonet. ... Then I found for some reason I could not move my leg. I thought, 'Hell I can't die here like this, got to do something'. I found I could move my leg now. I had been hit [in the hip] but did not know it. ... Suddenly a bugle sounded down the road I had been on and looking up, my hair stood on end as I saw about 30 Chinese [soldiers] racing in my direction approximately 100 yards [80 metres] from me. I felt horribly lonely and bloody scared. They came at me firing from the hip, led by a young squad leader ... I don't think there was a more frightened person in all the world. I said 'Arrr, shit!" and gave them a big grin and suddenly I was not frightened any more. Then you wouldn't want to know, up they came and patted me on the back and all crowded around me. All I could do was give a sickly grin. The Chinese then took me up a mountain that overlooked the Battalion HQ area. I was handed over to some sort of officer and thought that I had landed in a queers' outfit. He took me by the hand and guided me in the dark around obstacles etc. Even though I felt crook and disgusted with myself for being caught, I had to laugh and hoped that none of my mates could be watching me being held by the hand by this 'poof'. All around me were hundreds of Chinese with their own personal tree. When they moved it was like a whole forest moving. Not only that but they all seemed to possess a couple of weapons each [Note: possibly taken from dead comrades]. Down in the reverse slope were dozens of mules with mountain guns and ammo on board. Looking at this mob gave me uneasy feelings for the Battalion and not knowing how they had fared [during the period of my subsequent captivity] I made things worse. Author "Bob" Breen Another casualty of the withdrawal south of the remainder of BHQ was Private 'Slim' Madden, a signaler who was concussed by a Chinese mortar bomb explosion. In the dark and confusion of the preparations for withdrawal none of his comrades noticed that he was left behind. He was subsequently captured when the Chinese swept into the area after BHQ had moved out. Later in the day Parker and Madden were to meet and stay together as they were progressively evacuated north. Parker survived his captivity but Madden died six months later from malnutrition and ill-treatment. For his stoicism, resistance to any form of collaboration with the Chinese and the inspiration and help he gave to others, Private Madden was awarded a posthumous George Cross. Early that same morning Jack Gerke noticed that the sounds of firing and activity had stopped around BHQ. His troops in Support Company had kept their heads down during the night and had remained undiscovered by the marauding Chinese. He heard, from a passing Mortar Platoon driver, that BHQ was withdrawing and that he should, 'Bug out! Battalion headquarters is back down the road. Watch out for "Gooks" on the road: they hold the high ground over there!' By military standards this was a quick but effective set of orders: Mission, Situation: Own Troops, Enemy! Gerke wasted no time and sent his men and stores in vehicles down the road to run the gauntlet of rifle and machine gun fire without tank support. Fortunately, there were no casualties and plenty of vehicles for the task. Gerke commandeered several vehicles left by the US 4.2 inch Heavy Mortar Company and was able to take several Australians aboard who had become separated from their sub-units and were withdrawing on foot. George Harris Harold Mulry was calling out for troops to come with him to take all the ground back again. Myself and a few others around Company Headquarters jumped up with the 3 Platoon blokes and we charged down at the Chinese. The Chinese just all of a sudden turned and ran away. They didn't feel like fighting us anymore. We were getting them in the back as they were running away. They ran down the feature and tried to hide in thickets or any low ground they could find down towards the creek bed itself. The Chinese were very stupid to stay there. We could see them and we began having a real good time. We began to pick them off while they lay on the ground or when they broke cover like darting rabbits. We were enjoying ourselves until our dear old Major [O'Dowd] decided to stop us firing because ammunition was very scarce. "Tassie" Long I observed numerous groups of Chinese pulling back from A Company's position and others around the slopes leading up to A Company. I ordered my machine guns to fire on them. I began counting the number of Chinese who fell from this fire. I got up to a number of about 40 and stopped counting. Darcy Laughlin This attack on the company position was launched from the right flank [from east to west] and was aimed at splitting the company in two by cutting the centre of the position where CHQ was holding. The enemy attack numbered from fifty to seventy. Fire from tanks and small arms was directed against the assault which only succeeded in reaching the edge of our perimeter. By this time it was dawn and, in the growing light, the enemy could be clearly seen in the valley below B Company across to A and C Companies. His [the enemy's] position was quite open and the area between the companies was an excellent killing ground. This area was now subjected to intensive fire from tanks and all other available weapons. The enemy began to withdraw northward up the valley, being harassed all the way by MMG and artillery fire causing extensive casualties. "Norm" Gravener After several infiltrations had occurred during the night - forward and to the flank - I observed a reconnaissance party moving towards us, an long way forward of A Company, up a spur line leading to 12 Platoon's position. I was soon going to find out whether occupying the ground forward of the summit would pay off or not. ... We engaged this reconnaissance party. That was the prelude to the first of the attacks which occurred on our position against 12 Platoon at about 7 o'clock in the morning. 12 Platoon was hit hard and they had a few people wounded - about 7 to 8 casualties which was not too bad considering the strength of the attack. Johnny Ward, the Platoon Commander, and his men were well outnumbered and had a difficult position to hold. However, the Chinese also had a hard time locating his position in the trees after they came over the edge of the feature. To get to Ward's perimeter, the Chinese had a long, hard climb followed by a 50 metre dash. I was also able to direct artillery fire onto them as they made their way up the ridges. And that was the way it ran - pretty well all morning. The Chinese just kept attacking 12 Platoon and they kept knocking them back. Later, Johnny Ward, who was commanding very meritoriously I might add, phoned me - we still had a telephone link. He said, 'I think you should come down here, Boss. The bastards are all over the place. I think perhaps we should be moved.' I remember quite distinctly my reply: it was quite simple - I said, 'Johnny, all we have to do is sit tight and it will be all right'. Very simple language - implying all we had to do was hold position. "Stan" Connelly The order came out that we were to recover the ground that we had already vacated. We could see the Chinese occupying the ground as soon as we moved out. There was no exchange of shots. They knew we were moving and we knew they were occupying the positions we were vacating. There was a large slit trench near the road between us and the low hills we had occupied overnight. This trench had to be cleared before we could go back and occupy the positions we had left. It was my privilege to be a member of 5 Section that was given the job of clearing that trench. We formed a line and the Platoon Commander, Lieutenant McGregor, and the Platoon Sergeant came along to our rear. We believed the trench was occupied by eight to 10 Chinese. When we got within 20 yards of it, it was occupied by a great deal more than 10. But it was too late to do anything else but go on with the job. We were advancing at the run. All members of the section were firing at the trench and the Chinese were returning fire. I was wondering what was going to happen when we got to the trench because training never quite takes you to the point of leaping into trenches or coming to such close quarters ... I remember my Number 2, Rod Grey, falling on my left and my good mate, 'Gene' Tunney, falling on my right. I could hear the bullets whistling past my ears and I thought, 'My turn is not far off'. Sure enough, I was knocked completely off my feet by a .30 calibre round that drilled a hole right through the front of my right thigh and came out the back taking off much of my buttock. Fortunately there was no bone damage. It was like being hit by a truck. I was completely stunned. I fell within 5 yards of the Chinese trench - head towards the trench, Bren gun on a sling over my neck and two fairly full basic pouches of Bren gun ammunition in magazines on my web belt - a total of about 50-60 pounds. (recalling his feelings as he lay in front of the Chinese trenches): I was thinking, 'How in the hell am I going to get out of this?' I could hear the Chinese talking to each other 6 to 8 feet away. Surely they could see me and decide just to pump a few more rounds into me to make sure I was dead. Words cannot describe the fear I felt. I took stock of my position and decided that if I could release my web belt and shuck my gear I could make a dash for a low mound about 20 yards to my rear. I did not know whether I could even stand up. I wasn't sure how much damage had been done. I did not want to wait to be shot. As fast as I could, I threw off my gear and jumped to my feet and hopped, limped, hobbled and staggered over the longest 20 yards I have ever traveled. I heard a few shots go over my shoulder but I made it safely. Author "Bob" Breen Meanwhile, Jack Gerke was involved in consolidating elements of F Echelon and BHQ back with the Middlesex. He had also been involved with organizing the movement of the vehicles of the US Mortar Company back to the same area. Eyles, Bennett and From appear to have put their men on the ground near the Middlesex position and were awaiting further direction. Many men felt that they were out of danger and were catching up on the sleep they had lost the night before. D'Arcy Laughlin ... the platoon (Montgomerie's) moved into attack from the right flank. When approximately 25 yards from the enemy position, a bayonet charge was ordered and the leading section led by Corporal Davie took the first enemy-held trench at bayonet point. Lieutenant Montgomerie quickly reorganized his platoon and, in fierce hand-to-hand combat, gradually proceeded to clear to defensive position - trench by trench. The enemy resisted strongly and fought fanatically to hold their position. Using grenades and machine carbines [Owen Machine Carbines] this platoon cleared their way through the enemy position. It now became evident that more enemy were entrenched on a knoll further on and were now firing on leading elements of 4 Platoon. Leaving the rear sections to continue the cleaning up of the position, the platoon commander [Montgomerie] with the leading section now attacked the second position. The might and the aggressiveness of the attack upset the enemy and some openly fled: the majority remained and fought to the death.' Author "Bob" Breen Those who observed Montgomerie's attack described it as one of the finest and most aggressive actions they had seen at platoon level. The use of bayonets produced extra ferocity among the Australians and had the psychological effect of forcing many Chinese to flee in terror across the valley floor to run the gauntlet of small arms fire from those supporting the attack - the chance of a bullet better than the probability of a bayonet thrust. Wilfred Millar (US tank commander) I observed him (Ferguson) personally as we continued our forays into and out of the area of the encircled Australian soldiers, during which time Colonel Ferguson was calm, acted like he was in total command of the situation, and [showed by his demeanour that he believed] that his organization would triumph. He demonstrated great concern for his wounded and his encircled men and had no apparent regard for his own personal safety. He exposed himself to enemy fire by getting out of the tank, speaking to the wounded, and walking among his troops as if it was just a practice drill back in Australia. "Norm" Gravener The attacks on this position were always launched in depth on a narrow frontage of 4 to 5 men. Each assault was supported by a platoon-sized formation firing and throwing grenades and by preparatory mortar fire. 12 Platoon met these attacks with LMG, Small Arms (SA) fire and No 36 grenades in the final stages of the enemy assault. The enemy suffered heavy casualties in each of the six attacks launched [up until 1030 hrs] and an estimated enemy platoon was destroyed. Our casualties at this stage were very light. "Ray" McKenzie Early on the afternoon of the 24th, I was informed that I was required at company headquarters (CHQ) with my radio. On the way I had to cross a small saddle. As I entered the saddle I heard a machine gun fire and saw the fall of shot in front of me. I went to ground quickly on the reverse slope and continued onto CHQ. On arriving at CHQ I was informed that the Company radio battery was dead and, as I had no mortars to direct, could they get my battery. This was done. When I arrived back at my old position, one of the diggers said, 'Gee, you were lucky when you were going to CHQ. That burst of machine gun fire nearly got you!' I said, 'Not lucky, he was firing high. I saw the fall of shot in front.' He said, 'It did not all fall in front. There was a lot falling behind you.' So it would appear that I had been caught in the centre of a machine gun burst and had not been touched. 24th April 1951 was not my day to die. George Harris We all knew quite well that they [the senior officers] had to do something with A Company. I though that one of the other companies would come up and relieve us - two companies would have been ideal. But with all our casualties and the way we were exposed on the ridge, we could not have held for another night. We had to leave our dead behind which was a bit painful. We lined them all up; we could not carry them. We even had to destroy some of our own weapons because we did not have sufficient men to carry them all. (The circumstances of Ingram's death were recalled by Harris later). After one of the attacks early on 24 April, Roy called out to me that a group of Chinese were creeping around to the rear of CHQ. He called out this warning and also stated that he was bringing in a badly wounded man. I called back and told him to bring the wounded man around a small spur to our position and to keep quiet or he would get himself shot. The battle restarted and I did not see him again until we drove the Chinese out of 1 Platoon's position after dawn. Both of them were dead. Roy Ingram had his arm around his friend where he was half carrying him. Most of Roy's hand was blown off and he had his handkerchief wrapped around it. He had not told me that he also was wounded when he was helping his digger mate. I wished he had because I would have got to him and helped. He may have died through loss of blood or was hit again bringing his friend out. He did not think of himself. He warned us that the Chinese had got around to our rear so we could engage them. He died helping a mate and warning his friends. "Ray" McKenzie As I was leaving to return to my original position near the MMGs, I saw a US Marine Corsair line up and start a run in on our position. I was angry about this because our marker panels were clearly visible. I saw the big silver bomb [NAPALM] leave the plane and watched it fall in the D Company area, on 10 Platoon, where I had been two minutes before. The napalm exploded and took all the oxygen out of the air. I felt like I was just breathing heat. 'Nugget' Dunque Napalm is a pretty ferocious sort of weapon. Fortunately the bomb itself missed the main D Company position and landed on the perimeter near 10 and 11 Platoon. This set off a good deal of the ammunition stored there and caused some problems for the lads. After the napalm hit I began to go around in my capacity as the medical orderly and pull people out and tend to their injuries. I was reaching into a trench to grab a chap who had all his grenades lined up on the edge which was customary at the time. The grenades went off and blew me a considerable distance down the hill. Luck being what it is, I got very few injuries out of it - just a few shrapnel wounds to the leg. ... Earlier in the morning I had been wounded in the fore part of my head. I must have looked a sight. I was sitting there, stunned and no doubt feeling a bit sick and sorry for myself. I then saw the most appalling apparition. A man with no flesh - his hands were dripping flesh - completely naked. As he walked, I saw these huge bloated feet. The sticks and the stones came up through his feet. He sat down next to me. I didn't know who he was. He looked at me and said, 'Jesus, Nugget, you're having a bad day'. George Harris Some of those burnt by the napalm were like roasted meat. Their faces and hands had been barbecued. Giddens was particularly bad. His hands had been reduced to stumps and he had some shocking facial scars. David Mannett I think the most courageous act I can recall was by one of the soldiers injured as a result of the napalm attack and how he handled his injuries during what was a long and arduous withdrawal. The soldier's name was Harold Giddens. He was very badly burned - 3rd degree burns over most of his arms, hands and face. Notwithstanding his injuries, he offered encouragement to others. He was able to say that the attention he needed should be no more than that needed by others. Through the handling of his own injuries he was an example to a great number of us who saw what he did. Author "Bob" Breen Neither Gravener or O'Dowd had requested air support that afternoon. The request would have had to have come from Ferguson or the Brigade staff. The dropping of napalm on D Company was caused by either poor instructions from whoever was coordinating air support at the Brigade headquarters or poor target identification by the spotter aircraft that fired the targeting rocket into D Company's position. The latter is more likely, despite the fact that D Company had their brightly coloured panels displayed warning aircraft that they were a UN unit. Fortunately, a second Corsair that was about to make its run to drop more napalm was warned off by frantic radio messages from Australian signalers and US tank commanders who viewed the accident from further down the valley. (The following extracts from the NSW Branch Royal United Service Institute are gratefully acknowledged) "Ben" O'Dowd" While the O Group was still in progress a message came through for the defensive positions to be occupied. The Commanding Officer then returned to the Battalion to organise the forward movement of the rifle companies while we proceeded with our reconnaissance. A Company had been allocated all the ground between the road and the crest of Point 504. From my point of view it represented a classic case of 'occupy the lot and be weak everywhere or concentrate in strength at a vital point'. I decided to give away the higher (east) end and occupy only the lower end of the feature where we could support B Company in denying the enemy the use of the road. I sited Gardner's 1 Platoon nearest the road and Mulry's 3 Platoon alongside, where the ground began to rise sharply. Above him, on the crest overlooking 1 and 3 Platoons, Brumfield's 2 Platoon took up position. There was still a gap between Gardner and Mulry which was plugged by inserting Company Headquarters and Lennie Lenoy's Medium Machine Gun (MMG) Section - by no means text book stuff with everything in the shop window but, then, there was an awful lot of territory to cover. In any case the ridge was too narrow to permit a reserve, even if I had been able to create one. As daylight began to fade a trickle of Republic of Korea (south) ROK soldiers appeared, heading south along the road. There was nothing disturbing about this at first but, as the mob thickened and speeding vehicles loaded with ROK soldiers began to scatter them, they developed into a disorganized, shouting mob of panic-ridden rabble. Then a flood of civilian refugees began to appear - mixed in with ROK soldiers, women, children and animals - all bunched together in a confusing noisy melee. Now we did have something to worry about. Our experience in Korea was that Chinese troops would mix with civilians, using their cover to infiltrate to our rear. At this time it would have been comforting to have had the capacity to call on defensive fire tasks to disrupt the Chinese in their assembly areas as they prepared to attack us. My New Zealand artillery officer advised me that they could not lay on any sort of support because the guns, having arrived after dark were not surveyed in. I had to believe him! Instead of directing fire for us he and his signaler were killed during the fighting. As well, the United Stated 4.2-inch Mortar Observation Post Officer could not fire for the simple reason that his gun crews had taken to the hills. My 3-inch Mortar Fire Controller had a legitimate excuse as his crews were actively involved with the enemy in our rear. Of course I had the Medium Machine Gun Section but in close quarters fighting at night the Vickers guns are of very limited value. We therefore had none of the usual deterrents to interpose between us and the attackers - no fire support, no anti-personnel mines nor barbed wire. The impending battle was to be a very personal affair - soldier against soldier in the dark. In the moonlight our effective killing range was reduced to visibility distance, therefore, the attack had to be stopped in the time it took the enemy to run up-hill ten to fifteen yards. As soon as shape appeared out of the gloom our soldiers would produce as much rapid fire as each individual weapon allowed. As each attack was beaten back the Chinese remnants withdrew. Then there would be silence for a while which would be broken by the next outburst of whistles and bugles heralding another assault. When each attack subsided our section and platoon commanders cleared the dead and wounded to the reverse slopes where the Company RAAMC medic, Nobby Clark, and his stretcher bearers would do their best for the wounded. As far as possible the vacated weapon pits were then manned by fit men to await the next assault and, maybe, a fate similar to the previous occupants. With daylight - and expanded field of fire - the nature of the battle changed. The Chinese, who had the initiative under the cover of darkness, were now caught in the open, holed-up in small hollows of ground or behind tufts of heather. This provided our men with a brief session of revenge as they cut down enemy scurrying from scanty cover in search of more suitable protection. I had to spoil this sport and call a cease-fire because we had already used a lot of ammunition, re-supply was by no means assured and development of the tactical situation from here left no room for optimism. From where we stood it was abundantly clear that once B Company vacated their knoll the Chinese would move in and look right down our exposed left flank. I got hold of the Commanding Officer as soon as I could and made the point that B Company must go back. There was no immediate response to this request and, predictably, it was not long before we were treated to glimpses of the Chinese throwing up dirt as they consolidated their easy gain. In the process of withdrawing from their hill B Company managed to capture thirty-five to forty bewildered prisoners whom we could well have done without. B Company made two attempts to return to their overnight position but, by then, the Chinese had consolidated and nothing short of a major attack was going to dislodge them. There were sixteen tanks in the area and there was line communication to the artillery. If either, or both, had been used it may have made a difference. They came up the ridge running north from .504 to attack Johnny Ward's 12 Platoon at 0700 hours and were pushed off. Attacks were repeated every thirty minutes for the next three-and-a-half hours - then sporadically for the remainder of the day. Someone - certainly not Norm Gravener nor me - ordered a napalm strike to support D Company, without advising us. The CORSAIRS came in with the leading plane dropping its load on Company Headquarters and Dave Mannett's 10 Platoon, killing two, wounding others and starting shrub fires. Sometime after midday the Commanding Officer came on the air to advise me that no relief would be coming our way and that I had approval to take a shot at getting the rifle companies out. The problem now was to decide how. To neutralise the enemy across the road I requested artillery to open up at 1600 hours with smoke to obscure enemy visibility - and high explosive, mixed in, to curb any tendency to inquisitiveness. To clear the withdrawal route I ordered B Company to push down to the escape route to the ford, closest to the Middlesex, and secure both sides. If they found any enemy astride the escape route they were to attack to drive them off. If they were unable to shift the enemy they were to keep him busy until I could get there with another company. In anticipation of certain follow-up by the enemy confronting D Company I decided to employ the standard leapfrog tactic: one company on the ground, one setting up the next fall-back position and one in movement. As predicted, the Chinese lost no time in pursuit once they found C Company gone, and came on until given a bloody nose by the company waiting for them. This leapfrog routine was followed all the way down the ridge but we were denied a clean break. That was bad news. The good news came, however, when Darcy Laughlin reported that B Company had reached the ford without sighting the enemy. To me this was incredible! On reaching the ford I found Lieutenant Jim Young had been posted to see the companies across. B, C and D Companies were already over, leaving A Company still at the last delaying position on the ridge. I called up Bob Murdoch and was informed that the enemy were still pressing him. I told him to break contact and shake them off if possible. It would be very messy indeed if we were being shot at whilst crossing the ford. The stream was a wide expanse of shallow water at this point and, by now, brightly moonlit. Jim and I waited in silence until Brumfield's 2 Platoon arrived from the expected direction, the tail-enders assuring us that the remainder of the company was following - but they were not! With the last of the rifle companies in Sergeant Harris was sent to stand down the tanks covering the road above the ford and I reported to the Commanding Officer at the checkpoint, in the Middlesex area, that the withdrawal was complete. The Kapyong battle was a demonstration that the Australian soldier in Korea had every right to the title of Digger, along with those who forged the reputation in two world wars. Officers study, train and plan but it is all a negative exercise unless they have soldiers with the courage and determination to give expression to such plans. At Kapyong A Company fought off wave after wave of fanatical attacks all through one night. They fought from half-made weapon pits. They removed their dead and wounded, and occupied their weapon pits to await the next onslaught - with a good chance of a similar fate as the previous occupant - fully aware of the chance of survival if seriously wounded. They knew they were cut off with what looked a poor chance of escape. In these circumstances any panic or break in morale would have been disastrous. I don't believe that this possibility existed. They gave as good as they got, fought it out and won. Withdrawals are always tough on morale and discipline. The urge to run, to put distance between oneself and danger is instinctive. Add to this the mental state of men who have been under severe stress for a prolonged period and you can begin to make excuses. At Kapyong no excuses were necessary. The men took up fall-back positions quietly and efficiently, waiting there for the enemy to show himself. When ordered to move they did so with routine efficiency so that the operation worked smoothly, as in an exercise back in Australia. The Diggers won he Battle of Kapyong! "Frank" Hassett What shines out like a beacon is the courage, skill and cool headedness of the officers and men in defeating the Chinese attacks and withdrawing in such good order. (The following extracts from the journal of the Royal United Service Institute NSW are gratefully acknowledged) Arthur Stanley For the attack on the two .220 features leading up to 355, C Company moved out at first light after completing our preliminary checks on ammunition, radios, rations, etc. In the fog we moved quickly across the valley. 7 Platoon, under Lieutenant Pears, led the attack. The platoon suffered the first casualties and then Company Headquarters also had some men wounded. I supervised the work of the stretcher bearers in attending to the casualties and as we badly needed ammunition, entrenching tools, radio batteries and rations, these were removed from the wounded. Although we were short of water each of the wounded men was evacuated with two full water bottles. Both the wounded and the prisoners taken were sent back to Battalion Headquarters. . "Frank" Hassett B Company led off the attack to 317 (Maryang San) at 0500 hours, followed thirty minutes later by D Company, both to cross the valley, climb the ridge-line and turn west to attack towards .317, with B Company leading, backed up by D Company. It was a nightmarish situation:
It was a navigational nightmare but a tactical Godsend. "Bas" Hardiman D Company moved off 30 minutes after B Company passed through D Company. In heavy fog we moved north across the valley floor, climbed the ridge-line then moved west towards the objective. Young's platoon was leading and as it moved out of a gully the Chinese opened up at very short range, wounding the leading Bren gunner. We could not see the enemy owing to the fog but as the company closed-up I reorganized for the attack. Suddenly, as we moved in on the Chinese, the fog lifted and a Chinese medium machine gun fired three long bursts before it was silenced. Unfortunately, I was one of the first casualties and Jim Young then took command of the company. The operation continued successfully. D Company killed thirty Chinese and captured ten, but our losses were seven wounded. "Frank" Hassett I chose 0800 hours as H Hour as all questions of surprise had now gone and I wanted the fog to lift so that we could take full advantage of the heavy supporting fire available to us. In this supporting fire programme I had:
I thought that the objective would disintegrate from all this fire but the Chinese, sheltering on the reverse slopes, rose up and gave B Company a bad time. "Jim" Hughes was a platoon commander in that attack, "Jim" Hughes Suddenly rifle fire erupted behind the lead platoons. It appeared that the Chinese had withdrawn off the ridge, let the lead platoons pass and then attacked Company Headquarters and 5 Platoon. A series of fierce fire-fights broke out and the lead platoons fought back to assist Company Headquarters and 5 Platoon. Our section commanders displayed great initiative in attacking the various groups of Chinese who suddenly appeared. To fight the enemy we used small arms, grenades, rifle butts and even bare hands. In that fierce battle we lost five killed and 12 wounded, and we killed over 20 Chinese. One of our killed in action was the Company Sergeant Major. Without a word being said, our Mortar Fire Controller (Sergeant Strong) took upon himself the duties of CSM and MFC. The shelling naturally forced us to use existing pits - while attempts were made to link our quite separate positions into one. Eventually, out of chaos came order! Chinese counter-attacks and further shelling during the day cost us another 7 casualties, so we were forced to tighten our company perimeter. A shortage of ammunition prevailed - despite good fire control - and we were plagued with the problem of evacuating casualties. However, help was at hand. Our situation was well known at Battalion Headquarters who organised re-supply porters, casualty evacuation and reinforcements. "Frank" Hassett My military mind was telling me that a further attack by A Company, through B Company and down to .217, would be a good tactical move for the Brigade overall. But, when I asked the Brigadier what 1 RNF was doing and he said "skirmishing", my head said that we had done enough and that I had to look after the security of my own Battalion. I told the Brigadier that, if the RNF were only skirmishing, I would not attack further, beyond THE HINGE. I had forgotten about this incident until, many years later, Jim Shelton told me that his Company Signaler had heard the conversation and reported it to him. "Jim" Hughes After 45 minutes the barrage of fire ceased and the Chinese attacked. All round the Company - like a battle cry - leaders at all levels shouted out the old rifle range order: 'WATCH YOUR FRONT!" We were shaken but we were ready for the enemy. During the night the Chinese attacked three times on our front and flanks. We were ably supported by our artillery, mortars and MMGs. Defensive fire tasks were frequently fired and walked in towards our perimeter. The enemy was tenacious and crawled to within feet of our trenches to throw stick grenades - which were quickly thrown back. Grenades were the only answer to those who got so close, as they were able to get under the fire of our light machine guns, because of the lie of the land. That said, I am convinced that our LMGs saved us with their effective fire. Our LMG gunners learned to fire a burst and then duck for cover as the Chinese attempted to knock them out. Some penetration of our position did occur but those who got in were quickly killed. Casualties were given first aid and were placed in some inner trenches for their safety. Our Company medic (Corporal Tommy Tunstall) regularly checked most of the casualties - and, luckily, did not become a casualty himself as he moved around. Ammunition problems again beset the Company and, with great difficulty, the Assault Pioneer Platoon made a further delivery to us. Re-supply was a risky business in all that shelling and we were grateful to those who undertook the task. When we ran out of grenades my signaler remembered the bazooka bombs strapped to my pack. He threw the bombs for all he was worth at the Chinese and - by the cry of pain that resulted - he was successful! In the early hours of 8 October ammunition was again a problem. All conventional .303 ammunition was passed to the LMGs and riflemen were issued with MK 8Z ammunition from a knocked out MMG. Initially, this ammunition worked OK but did make a mess of our rifles. In all, the Company went through four lines of ammunition on THE HINGE. Just before first light the Chinese attacks ceased. During stand-to we listened to the activity around us as the Chinese cleared the battlefield. We were ordered to hold fire for three hours. Consequently, clearing patrols were not mounted in lieu, listening posts were established. With the coming of first light, Support Company again assisted us by evacuating our casualties. We were very glad to see them! "Bushy" Pembroke We headed off down the slope of .317 about 0700 hours. Corporal Danny Powell's section was in the lead. I sent him forward to reconnoitre the knoll - trusting in the luck of the Irish - while the remainder of us went to ground. After some time he reported back that there was a large number of enemy on the knoll, some cooking breakfast, apparently feeling safe because of the thick fog. We decided, under the circumstances, to have a go. In whispers we quickly decided a plan of attack, with one section left of the track and the other on the right. We decided on a grenade assault with Danny Powell, who knew the exact location, giving the signal for all to throw grenades. The result was devastating for the main part of the Chinese force huddled over their cooking fires. We then charged forward firing rifles and Owen guns. I suggest that the Chinese made two mistakes. Remember, we (and they) had been fighting hard for some five days and the night before we had seized hill .317. They probably thought that we would be satisfied with that for a while and never dreamed that we would exploit forward so quickly. Secondly, they trusted in the fog to protect them, probably thinking that we would not move forward until the fog had lifted and we had a chance to carry out a visual reconnaissance. "Frank" Hassett I haven't mentioned the wonderful support which the Battalion had from the New Zealand Field Regiment, the 8th Irish Hussars, the Indian Field Ambulance, Brigade and Divisional units, the Korean porters and so on, but it was there - in full measure! It had been a hard six days but morale was high as the soldiers recognised that they had fought well. There was a wonderful feeling throughout the Battalion. There is no feeling like it - none at all. It made me think of Field Marshall Wavell's words: "It is a good thing war is so terrible or men would love it too much." René Lemercier Our tactical doctrine provides that we should always think two down and, especially as it has been said many times and in many ways that "after the first shot no plan is ever the same", it is essential that we must do more than lip service to train all commanders - be they section, platoon or company commanders - to experience operations two up. For any operation I also commend other virtues, of which an excess thereof cannot be a vice:
"Tom" Daly The men of 3 RAR fought in the battles of Kapyong and Maryang San. Their firsthand accounts of their experiences provide colour and put flesh on the dry bones of history. Kapyong veterans tend to make light of the incredible difficulties experienced in its defence, of the dogged resistance displayed by the soldiers and the hardships endured, especially by the wounded, lying exposed to the bitter cold during their long wait for evacuation. The withdrawal was brilliantly executed; a withdrawal in face of the enemy - one of the most difficult operations of war. Maryang San was a very different exercise. It was a carefully planned deliberate assault on a formidable and well defended objective, driven home with courage and determination. The main lessons which stand out from the operation are the importance of a simple flexible plan, clear and concise orders at all levels and good leadership. The importance of clear and definite orders is overwhelming since, once the attack is launched, the commander can exercise only limited control. Provided he has good communications he may influence the battle by his control of supporting fire and use of his reserves. The Commanding Officer, Hassett, had his Tactical Headquarters well forward. This is important for, although a battalion commander will seldom see much of the action through fog and smoke, he gets the feel of the battle - something one has to experience to really understand. But, on the ground, the battle is fought out by platoons and sections: and it is on them that he is dependent for success. Every man should know his objective and know how it is to be attained, because leaders become casualties and anyone may be called on to assume command - be it a section, platoon or company - and to maintain the momentum of the attack. The battle is fought out on the ground by platoons and sections, and success will depend to a great extent upon the skill and initiative of the junior leader. (The following extracts from the "Battle of Maryang San" by Bob Breen are gratefully acknowledged) THE BATTLE OF MARYANG SAN - 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment Korea, 2 - 8 October 1951John Coates The Battle of Maryang San, fought by the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) - 'Old Faithful' - in Korea in October 1951 is a post-World War 11 Classic. Of that encounter, Robert O'Neill the Official War Historian wrote:
And, in 1952 Colonel Tom Daly the then Director of Infantry and a future Chief of the General Staff, added:
For its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hassett (now General Sir Francis Hassett, Rtd) his officers, NCOs and men it was a testing time. The scale of manoeuvre of the rifle companies of 3 RAR during the action-packed five days of the Battle - by night, in fog, across rugged terrain and for much of the time under artillery and mortar fire - can only challenge contemporary Australian infantrymen to strive for similar levels of excellence. The display of endurance, courage and aggression during the Battle are timeless benchmarks for offensive operations. The quality of tactical decision-making by the Commanding Officer and his company and platoon commanders provides a rich source of analysis for all officers and NCOs in the 1990s and beyond. Brigadier George Taylor
The Australians were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hassett, a 33 year old Duntroon graduate with a distinguished world War 11 record in the Middle East and in the Pacific Campaign. He had taken over command from Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Ferguson in July 1951. Since then the battalion had been adjusting to working in a different brigade under a newly-appointed Brigade commander Brigadier George Taylor. "Frank" Hassett
"Jim" Hughes
"Jack" Gerke
"Basil"' Hardiman
"Frank" Hassett
"Jim" Shelton
"Bushy" Pembroke
"Jim" Hughes
Author "Bob" Breen Hassett's battle plan included provisions for the use of air support and the firepower of other combat arms such as artillery and armour. He recalled the plans he made later,
Arthur Rofe
"Jock" McCormick
"Jack Gerke"
"Jim" Shelton
"Basil" Hardiman,
"Wings" Nicholls'
"Jack" Gerke
CAPTURE OF THE 220 FEATURES AND THE
4 OCTOBER
"Jack" Gerke
"Maurie" Pears'
Arthur Stanley
"Jim" Mc Fadzean
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